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AVOIDING INJURIOUS CONSEQUENCES*
CnARLFs T. McCOR CK*
1. The General Rule.
Where one person has committed a tort, breach of contract or
other legal wrong against another it is incumbent upon the latter
to use such means as are reasonable under the circumstances to
avoid or minimize the damages. The person wronged cannot re-
cover for any item of damage which could thus have been avoided.
Legal rules and doctrines are designed not only to prevent
and repair individual loss and injustice but to protect and con-
serve the economic welfare and prosperity of the whole commun-
ity. Consequently, it is important that the rules for awarding
damages should be such as to discourage even persons against
whom wrongs have been committed from passively suffering econ-
omic loss which could be averted by reasonable efforts, or from
actively increasing such loss where prudence would inquire that
such activity cease. The machinery by which the law seeks to
encourage the avoidance of loss is by denying to the wronged party
a recovery for such losses as he could reasonably have avoided,'
and by allowing him to recover any loss, injury, or expense In-
curred in reasonable efforts to minimize his injury. It is the
* This article will form the basis of a chapter in an elementary textbook on
Damages, which will be published by the West Publishing Company, St. Paul,
Arinn.
** Dean and Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
1 The following general references may profitably be consulted: RESTATE-
MENT OF TIH LAW OF CONTRACTS (Am. L. Inst. 1930) tentative draft No. 8,
§ 327; 1 SEDGwircK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1920) c. 10; DECENNIAL DIGESTS,
title Damages, § 62. See also GA. AWN. CODE (MIchie, 1926) § 4398.
The rule of avoidable consequences is equally applicable to cases of tort
and breach of contract. Reichert v. Spiess, 203 App. Div. 134, 196 N. Y.
Supp. 466 (1922).
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AVOIDING INJURIOUS CONSEQUENCES
former, the negative rule, denying recovery for avoidable damages
which we treat in this section, leaving the affirmative branch to be
dealt with in a later section of this article.
The present rule is frequently described in the cases as a rule
which imposes a "duty" to minimize damages,' and the expres-
sion is a convenient one. However, it has been pointed out that
the "duty", if it can be so called, is not one for which a right of
action is given against the person who violates it. The penalty
is merely the disallowance of damages for losses which a compli-
ance with the "duty" would have avoided. It has been suggested
that the person wronged should not be spoken of as under a
"duty" to avoid damage but rather under a "disability" to re-
cover for avoidable loss.'
Some judges and writers have considered the present rule as
but an application of the principle which denies liability for in-
jurious consequences which are not proximately caused by the de-
fendant's wrongdoing.' Under this theory, if the plaintiff could
avoid the particular loss, it is the plaintiff's neglect, not the de-
fendant's wrongdoing, which has caused it. Oftentimes, however,
it is obvious that the defendant's wrongdoing is an active and sub-
stantial factor in producing the plaintiff's loss, even though that
loss could have been avoided by activity on plaintiff's part. For
example, this was true in a case where the drain-pipe on plaintiff's
land was obstructed by the building of a road-fill by the defendant,
but the plaintiff could lessen the damage to his crop by removing
the obstruction.' In such cases, it seems more realistic to recognize
that denial of recovery for avoidable injury is really a doctrine re-
stricting the limits of liability for the reasons of social and economic
policy mentioned at the beginning of this section. To base it on the
ground that the defendant's wrongdoing, though a substantial
cause in the popular sense, is not the "legal" or "proximate"
cause of the avoidable loss seems needlessly artificial, and likely to
obscure the underlying motive for the rule.!
Having its source in the same motives of conservation of
human and economic resources, is the doctrine of contributory
2 See, for example, Key v. Kingwood Oil Co., 110 Okla. 178, 236 Pac. 598(1925) and Taber v. Porter-Gildersleeve Co., 271 Pa. 245, 114 Atl. 773 (1921).
' See opinion of Burch, J., in Rock v. Vandine, 106 Kan. 588, 189 Pac. 157(1920); and notes (1917) 28 YAIM L. J. 827; (1921) 32 YALE L. J. 380;
CRANE, CASES ON DAMAGES, 102, n. 1.
4 Loker v. Damon, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 284 (1835); 1 SEDaWioK, op. ct. supra
n. 1, § 202.
5Compare Jenkins v. Stephens, 262 Pac. 274 (Utah, 1928).
0 See GREEN, THE RATIONALE Op PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927) chapters 1 and 6.
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negligence. The contributory negligence rule finds application,
however, at an earlier stage in the transaction than the rule of
avoidable consequences. If the plaintiff by negligent action or
inaction before the defendant's wrongdoing has been completed
has contributed to cause actual invasion of plaintiff's person or
property, the plaintiff is wholly barred of any relief. The doc-
trine of avoidable consequences comes into play at a later stage.!
Where the defendant has already committed an actionable wrong,
whether tort or breach of contract, then this doctrine limits the
plaintiff's recovery by disallowing only those items of damages
which could reasonably have been averted. For any injury or loss
not thus avoidable, the plaintiff may still recover. If the only
item of loss or damage sustained is thus barred under this princi-
ple, and the case is of the kind where "actual damage" must be
o shown, then probably the principle is properly asserted under the
guise of "contributory negligence" rather than "avoidable con-
sequences".' If, on the other hand, the action is one where a re-
covery of nominal damages! may be had, even though no actual
damage is recovered (as in trespass or breach of contract) then
if the defendant eliminates all the plaintiff's claims for actual
damage by showing that the plaintiff by reasonable care could
have avoided them, this does not go to the destruction of the cause
of action, nor prevent a recovery of nominal damages. Conse-
quently in cases where nominal damages are proper, which in-
7 In Dippold v. Cathlamet Lumber Co., 111 Ore. 199, 225 Pac. 202 (1924)
the plaintiff sued for damage to timber from fire which spread from de-
fendant's land. Defendant sought a non-suit on the ground that the evidence
showed that plaintiff was negligent in failing to aid defendant to prevent
the spreading of the fire. The court, however, held that such a contention
was one of contributory negligence, not open to the defendant because he had
not pleaded it, and said: "Contributory negligence and avoidable conse-
quences are two quite different things. The one is a bar to any action
whatever, and must be stated as a defense. The other simply goes to the
lessening of the damages caused by the acts of the defendant. Whether
in all cases evidence on that point may be admitted under the general issues
is not here decided. Contributory negligence acts concurrently with that of
the defendant. They are synchronous in their operation. The carelessness or
indifference of the plaintiff in the matter of lessening damages is successive
and subsequent to the carelessness of the defendant. They do not take ef-
fect at the same time. The defendant's negligence has spent its force and is
past. It is succeeded by that negligence of the plaintiff which causes an en-
hancement of the damages. The two are not to be confounded, although in
some instances the result-that is, the obliteration of damages-may be al-
most identical."
8 See HALE, DAmAGES (2d ed. 1912) 96.
" See Sm:uwIcK, DAMAGES (9th ed., 1920) c. 6, Noininal Damages.
1'Armfield v. Nash, 31 Miss. 361 (1856) (action against employer for
breach of contract in wrongfully discharging plaintiff. Plea: that plaintiff
could have avoided all damages in that he could have taken another position
3
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cludes all cases of breach of contract, the principle must be as-
serted under the name of "avoidable consequences".
While this distinction may be a mere matter of using different
labels for two sides of the same bottle, nevertheless, in the law
as it is administered it is not wholly without practical significance.
It is significant in that, as a matter of pleading, contributory
negligence is to be asserted as a complete defense' whereas the
doctrine of avoidable consequences is not considered a defense at
all, but merely a rule of damages by which certain particular
items of loss may be excluded from consideration." Being thus
a matter in "mitigation", it need not be specifically pleaded at
all by the defendant.
Nevertheless, though by the better view, the defendant need
not pleadi it, he does have the burden of proof. He-must bring
forward evidence that the plaintiff could reasonably have reduced
his loss, or avoided injurious consequences and he must finally
convince the jury of this in order to succeed on this issue.'
at equal wages. Held, not a sufficient plea in bar, as it does not defeat the
action but only goes in reduction of damages).
"The duty imposed on one to reduce or minimize his damages goes only
to the amount of the recovery and cannot be an absolute defense to an
injury already sustained." Bailey v. J. L. Roebuck Co., 135 Okla. 216, 275
Pac. 329 (1926).
"It must usually be specifically and affirmatively pleaded by the defendant,
but a few jurisdictions allow it to be shown under a denial. CLARIC, CODE
PLEADING (1928) 209, 210, 425. But in either event, it is a complete do-
fense.
12Western Real Estate Trustees v. Hughes, 96 C. C. A. 658, 172 Fed. 206,
211 (1909) (where plaintiff failed to remove part of his property from a
-building exposed by the collapse of defendant's wall, this did not bar a
recovery for unavoidable injury to the rest of his property).
Other recent cases in which the distinction has been noted are: Isenman v.
Burnell, 125 Me. 57, 130 Atl. 868 (1925); Currie v. Davis, Agent, 130 S. C.
408, 126 S. E. 119 (1923); Jenkins v. Stephens, supra n. 5.
'-This was clearly the common law view. Armfield v. Nash, supra n. 10;
POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 498. Even under the code pro-
cedure it seems the most convenient practice to permit defendant under a
mere denial to show plaintiff's failure to minimize damages. Indianapolis
Street By. Co. v. Robinson, 157 Ind. 414, 61 N. E. 936 (1901) (personal in-
jury); Swift & Co. v. Bleise, 63 Nob. 739, 89 N. W. 310, 57 L. R. A. 147
(1902) (personal injury). There is a substantial number of cases to the
contrary, however, which require this to be specially pleaded. C. N. 0. & T.
P. R. Co. v. Crabtree, 30 Ky. L. 1209, 100 S. W. 318 (1907) (personal in-jury) ; Amarillo Oil Co. v. Ranch Creek 0. & G. Co., 271 S. W. 145, 153,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925). The cases pro and con are collected in DEOENNIAL Di-
GESTS, title Damages, § 155. Of course, under no view would it be incumbent
upon plaintiff to allege that he had used reasonable care to minimize damages.
Bader v. Mills & Baker Co., 28 Wyo. 191, 201 Pae. 1012 (1921) (damage to
banks of irrigation ditch causing loss of crop).
U iCampbell v. Sauer, 111 C. C. A. 14, 189 Fed. 576, 580, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.)
837 (1911); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Riverside Bridge Co., 160 C. C.
A. 35, 247 Fed. 625 (1918) ; M. K. & T. R. Co. v. Edmonds, 74 Okla. 2, 174
4
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Illustrations of the Application of the Rule of Avoidable Con-
sequences.
The cases which most obviously call for the application of the
rule that the plaintiff cannot recover for such injury as he might
by reasonable conduct have avoided, are those where the plaintiff
by his own voluntary activity has unreasonably exposed himself
to damage or increased his injury. Thus, where a vendor in a
conditional sales contract unlawfully used unnecessary force in
seizing the property, an automobile, then in possession of the
debtor's wife, and the wife sues therefor, she cannot recover for
personal injuries caused by her insistence in remaining in the
car on a cold night after it had been removed to the vendor's
garage.' Similarly, where a purchaser of land learns that his
vendor had no title to the irrigation ditch which he had pur-
ported to sell, and thereafter the purchaser proceeds to plant a crop,
he cannot recover for the cost of planting and loss of the crop,
due to the failure to secure water for irrigation.' Likewise, a
cropper who plants seed which he knows to be defective, furnish-
ed by the landlord who was bound by his contract to furnish good
seed, is precluded from recovering for the inferiority of the
crop."' The buyer of a motion picture house, suing the seller for
misrepresentations inducing the sale, is barred from recovering
for loss incurred by continuing to operate the theater after he has
run it long enough to discover that loss is certain. The plain-
tiff is not even permitted ordinarily to continue to perform
services under a contract, where the other party repudiates. An
oil-driller who continues to drill in reliance on his contract after
the owner has repudiated it, cannot recover for the subsequent
performance.? Other illustrations of denial of recovery for dam-
Pac. 1052 (1918) (personal injuries); Panhandle & S. F. R. Co. v. Norton, 188
S. W. 1011 (Tex. Civ. App., 1916); R. P. Arkley Lbr. Co. v. Vincent, 121 Wash.
512, 209 Pac. 690 (1922) ; Bader v. Mills & Baker Co., supra n. 13; DECENNIAL
DIGESTS, title Damages, § 163 (2).
Geissler v. Geissler, 96 Wash. 150, 164 Pac. 746, 166 Pac. 1119 (1917).
"Hickman v. Johnson, 36 Cal. App. 342, 178 Pac. 145 (1918).
17 Wavra v. Karr, 142 Minn. 248, 172 N. W. 118 (1919).
IHarmon v. Dickerson, 184 S. W. 139 (Mo. App. 1916).
"Clark v. Marsiglia, I Denio (N. Y.) 317, 43 Am. Dec. 670 (1845).
"Craig v. Higgins, 31 Wyo. 166, 224 Pac. 668 (1924). Compare News Pub.
Co. v. S. B. Barrett Rubber Co., 127 So. 749 (La. App., 1930). An advertiser
signed a contract with a newspaper for the publication of his advertisement
for twelve months. He repudiated the contract after a few months, but the
publisher continued to publish it for the twelve months, and the court held
that the publisher was not required to minimize damages by stopping the
advertisement.
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age incurred by plaintiff's own voluntary activity are numerous.'
Perhaps even more frequent are the cases where the plain-
tiff's mere supineness and inactivity in a situation where active
diligence to avert loss or harm are needed, bars his claim for re-
sultant damage. In a New York case, it appeared that a creditor's
attorney wrongfully allowed a judgment to be entered against the
debtor after the debt had been paid and the attorney's receipt
given therefor. The debtor's employer discharged him when he
learned of the judgment and did not believe the debtor's assertion
that it had been paid. The debtor, offended at this disbelief, did
not display the attorney's receipt in proof of his statement. The
court held him precluded by this failure from recovering damages
for the discharge, in the action against the creditor for the wrong-
ful entry of judgment.= Where damage threatens through failure
of warranted appliances or machinery to do the work, the pur-
chaser must use reasonable steps to replace them with efficient ones
and if he fails he cannot charge the seller with the consequent
los& Applications of the rule are as widely varying in character
as are the different kinds of damage claims. Thus, where you
know that another has negligently set fire to your fence, you may
not recover for the escape of cattle when you by reasonable dili-
gence could have prevented it." Again, one whose automobile has
been damaged by the fault of another and who delays having it
repaired, cannot recover for his loss of the use of the vehicle, after
a reasonable time within which the repairs might have been corn-
See for examples: Eastern Texas Electric Co. v. Reagan, 228 S. W. 366(Tex. Civ. App., 1921) (on failure of interurban car to stop for him, plain-
tiff instead of going to hotel, walked ten or twelve miles to next town);
Cedar Rapids, etc., Ry. & Light Co. v. Spiague Electric Co., 203 Ill. App. 424,
affirmed 280 Ill. 386, 117 N. E. 461 (1917) (purchaser continues to use ia-
perfect warranted article without repairing or requesting seller to repair,
after knowledge of defect); Thompson v. De Long, 267 Pa. 212, 110 Atl. 251,
9 A. L. R. 1326 (1920) (landowner, being damaged by rain coming through
opening in party wall prevents wrongdoer's servants from protecting the
wall); Corcoran v. Des Moines, 205 Iowa 405, 215 N. W. 948 (1927) (owner
on city's changing grade of street, thus damaging foundation of house,
could have repaired but tore house down instead).
2Penna v. Atlantic Macaroni Co., 174 App. Div. 436, 161 N. Y. Supp. 191(1916).
2Cohn v. Bessemer Gas Engine Co., 44 Cal. 85, 186 Pac. 200 (1920)(gas engine for irrigation pump proved insufficient during first year; owner
should replace with efficient engine thereafter, failing which he cannot re-
cover for subsequent damage).
2Wisconsin & Ark. Lbr. Co. v. Scott, 167 Ark. 84, 267 S. W. 780 (1925);
but compare Freeman v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 101 Kan. 516, 167 Pac. 1062 (1917)(owner of escaping cattle not required to go on right of way of defendant
railway and repair cattle guard after defendant's refusal to do so).
6
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pleted.' Where the owner of a building sees an opening made in
his boundary wall by his neighbor's wrongful acts, but allows his
good to remain exposed to damage, he cannot recover for
injury which a prompt removal would have avoided.' In short,
what the injured person can do at moderate expense or with rea-
sonable exertions7 to minimize the loss or injury, he must do, or
bear the risk of his inaction."
2. Only Reasonable Care Is Required.
While it is economically desirable that personal injuries and
business losses be avoided or minimized as far as possible by per-
sons against whom wrongs have been committed, yet we must
not in the application of the present doctrine lose sight of the
fact that it is always a conceded wrongdoer who seeks its pro-
tection. Obviously, there must be strict limits to the doctrine.
A wide latitude of discretion must be allowed to the person who by
another's wrong has been forced into a predicament where he is
faced with a probability of injury or loss. Only the conduct of a
reasonable man is requirbd of him. If a choice of two reasonable
courses presents itself, the person whose wrong forced the choice
cannot complain that one rather than the other is chosen. Some-
times a reasonable man might consider that either active efforts
to avoid damages or a passive awaiting of developments are
equally reasonable courses. If so, a failure to act would not be
penalized by the rule of avoidable consequences, even though it
later appears that activity would have reduced the loss. It should
not be assumed that only one course of conduct could reasonably
2 Hunter v. Quaintance, 69 Colo. 28, 168 Pac. 918 (1917) ; Rosenstein v. Ber-
nard, etc. Automobile Co., 192 Iowa 405, 180 N. W. 282 (1920).2 7Thompson v. DeLong, supra n. 21.
27Curtner v. Bank of Jonesboro, 175 Ark. 539, 299 S. W. 994 (1927) (loss
of sale by failure to furnish abstract of title which could have been secured
for $65).
28To the examples in the text the following may be added: Southern R.
Co. v. Pruett, 200 Ala. 675, 77 So. 49 (1917) (passenger caused to spend
night in town, not her home, who declines offers of railroad's agents to take
her to a hotel or send her home in an automobile, cannot recover for incon-
venience or remaining in station all night); Central of Georgia R. Co. v.
Williams, 200 Ala. 73, 75 So. 401 (1917) (where animal is killed, owner is
charged with what he might have realized from utilizing carcass and hide);
St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Tucker, 161 Ark. 140, 255 S. W. 553 (1923) (con-
signee must receive from carrier goods damaged in transit); Fulton v. Canno,
222 N. Y. 189, 118 N. E. 633 (1918) (where buyer repudiates contract to
purchase milk, seller may not permit the milk to spoil in his hands without
making effort to avoid loss); Gervis v. Kay, 294 Pa. 518, 144 Ati. 529 (1928)
(when broker wrongfully disposes of customer's stock, within reasonable time
latter must purchase similar stock and can recover no more than what the
cost of so purchasing would be).
Since the standard of reasonableness is an indefinite one, extreme cases oc-
7
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have been chosen by the party wronged.' His conduct must be
judged in the light of one viewing the situation at the time the
problem was presented to him. Certainly, as a person wronged,
he is not to be judged by the same standards as apply to one who
has had presented to him the choice of whether he will adopt a
course of conduct which will probably injure another. In other
words, the standard of due care in determining liability in tort
for negligence should be much stricter than the standard of rea-
sonableness in choice of expedients to reduce or avoid damages
applied against a person against whom a wrong has been com-
mitted.
He cannot be expected to incur unusual, unwarranted, or
disproportionate expense in his efforts to avoid damages. *Where
the defendant has wrongfully filed for record a mortgage on
plaintiff's land, thus defeating a sale of the land, the defendant
cannot escape liability for the loss by showing that plaintiff could
have secured a release of the mortgage by paying to defendant's
agent a wholly unwarranted commission- upon a loan which was
never made." In a recent Michigan case the plaintiff who had
casionally arise which seem near or beyond the borderline. In Adams v.Clover Hill Farms, 86 Ore. 140, 167 Pac. 1015 (1917) the plaintiff sued for
nuisance in that his neighbor permitted polluted surface water to come uponplaintiff's swampy land, thus rendering the standing water unwholesome forplaintiff's cattle. It was held that plaintiff must set barrels in the swamp so
that the water could be purified by percolating into the barrels. The plain-
tiff's own conduct, it is true, had been obstinate and contumacious in refusing
to sell a right of way across his land for a drain. Also, in Bear Cat Mining
Co. v. Grasselli Chem. Co., 159 C. C. A. 380, 247 Fed. 286, L. R. A. 1918 C,907 (1917)' the sub-lessee of a mine agreed with his lessor to pump the waterfrom the mine continuously. The head lease required continuous pumping onpenalty of forfeiture. The sub-lessee wrongly ceased pumping and notifiedhis lessor. The head-lease was forfeited, and the sub-lessor sues the sub-lessee for this loss. Recovery for this item of damage was denied on theground that the plaintiff could itself have pumped the mine and avoided the
forfeiture at reasonable expense. And it has been held that where plain-
tiff's chattels have been wrongfully caused to be seized under attachment
or like process, the aggrieved person must, if he is able, make a bond and
replevy the property thus wrongfully seized, from the sheriff's hands or must
attempt to rent other property in its place, and only if these expedients fail
can he recover for loss of use. Lawson v. Brokmann, 116 Kan. 102, 226
Pac. 252 (1924); McCauley v. McElroy, 199 S. W. 317 (Tex. Civ. App., 1917)(writ of error refused by Supreme Court); W. B. Moses and Sons v. Lockwood,
54 App. D. C. 115, 295 Fed. 936 (1924).
Compare Den Norske Ameriekalinje, etc., v. Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n.,
226 N. Y. 1, 122 N. E. 463 (1919), CRANE, CASES ON DAMAGES, 122, 128 n. 9,
where it was held that a corporation which was libeled might recover the
cost of publishing a denial in a newspaper, though it might not have been
required thus to minimize damages.
80 Vaught v. Jonothan L. Pettyjohn & Co., 104 Kan. 174, 178 Pac. 623 (1919).
But compare Marcell v. Midland Title Guarantee and Abstract Co., 112 Neb.
420, 199 N. W. 731 (1924) (plaintiff, suing abstract company for negligent
8
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purchased land from defendant sued for defendant's deceit in
representing that he owned the land, whereas in fact he had only
a contract to purchase. Plaintiff lost the land by being evicted by
the fee-owners and sued for its value. Defendant's contention was
that plaintiff should have bought the title piecemeal from the
various fee-owners, and cleared it by litigation with strangers.
The court rejected this contention. "Under these circumstances,"
the court said, "it was not the duty of plaintiff to hazard the pay-
ment of money upon such uncertainties, in an attempt to minimize
a loss to them occasioned by defendant's active fraud. "'
In another case, a railroad's water pipe-line leaked, thereby
flooding plaintiff's basement. The court held that plaintiff need
not avoid damage by paying out $250 for the construction of a
drain from the basement into the public sewer.' Where the
damage could be avoided by "the expenditure of a comparatively
small amount of money", however, the plaintiff must incur the
expenditure or stand the loss himself.'
The expenditure of unreasonable effort or exertion is not re-
quired of the person wronged. In an unusual federal case in
Illinois,' a cement plant discharged hot water into a stream above
the ice-fields of a company which harvested ice. The hot water
partially melted the ice-fields, but a greater amount of ice than
the plaintiff actually secured could have been harvested if the ice
company had built a pontoon-bridge across the open space melted
in the ice by the hot water. Because of the uncertainty and risk
of life involved in that method, the court held that the plaintiff
was not required to build the bridge. Again, the owner of a pecan
orchard, to whom young trees were shipped which were negligently
permitted by the express company to freeze, was not required to
plant all the frozen and damaged trees to see if some of them
would grow.' So also, where plaintiff's lands were flooded by de-
fendant's obstructing a creek, and the only evidence showed that
the building of a dam to prevent the flooding would have involved
unusual effort and expense, the plaintiff could not be charged with'
that burden.'
omission of attachment lien from abstract, was bound to pay off lien, to
prevent loss of land by sale under attachment foreclosure).
cnHankland v. Muirhead, 233 Mich. 390, 206 N. W. 549, 552 (1925).
2 Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Amicon Fruit Co., 269 Fed. 559, 14 A. L. R.
547 (C. C. A., W. Va., 1920).
"Sargent v. North End Water Co., 190 Cal. 512, 213 Pac. 33 (1923).
"Sandusky Portland Cement Co. v. Dixon Pure Ice Co., 163 C. C. A. 500,
251 Fed. 506 (Ill., 1918).
rAmerican Railway Express Co. v. Judd, 213 AIa. 242, 104 So. 418 (1925).
"Taylor v. Steadman, 143 Ark. 486, 220 S. W. 821 (1920).
9
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Likewise, inconvenience or financial sacrifice which would be
entailed in attempts to avoid or minimize damage may obviously
bear upon the reasonableness of adopting such a course. Thus,
where plaintiffs, one of whom was an invalid, were refused sleep-
ing-car berths for which they had contracted, they were not re-
quired to suspend their journey, half-way to their destination, un-
til berths should be available the next day.Y In another case, a
contractor made a bid upon public works in reliance upon the
agreement of certain sub-contractors to furnish the plumbing.
'When the sub-contractors repudiated their contract, tho, con-
tractor did not withdraw its bid to the state, and, when sued, the
sub-contractors contended that plaintiff should have minimized
damages by such withdrawal. The court held, however, to the
contrary and said: "It was not under an obligation to sacrifice
any substantial right of its own in order to minimize the loss of
the defendants . . . It was not required to take a course that
would subject it to the loss of profits on its own part of the bid,
and which as the trial court has in effect found, would to a mate-
rial extent adversely affect the good-will of its business."'
Application of the Principle to Particular Types of Cases-
Proper Treatment of Personal Injury.
One who has sustained a personal injury or any bodily ail-
ment through the fault of another must, if the situation is one
which calls for and admits of medical assistance, use reasonable
care to select a competent doctor,' and must submit himself to the
care and treatment prescribed by the latter. Any part of his
suffering or disability which could have been thus avoided is not
recoverable. The courts, however, are cautious about insisting
that due care requires submission to an operation. If the operation
is simple and not dangerous, a failure to submit when advised to
'Pullman Co. v. Walton, 152 Ark. 633, 239 S. W. 385, 23 A. L. R. 1296(1922).
Frederick Raff Co. v. Murphy, 110 Conn. 234, 147 At. 709, 712 (1929).
'Flint v. Conn. Hassam Paving Co., 92 Conn. 576, 103 Atl. 840 (1918), and
cases collected in DEcENNIAL DIGESTS, title Damages, § 62 (2). But even an
unlicensed doctor may serve, if a regular physician is unavailable. H. T.
Whitson Lumber Co. v. Upchurch, 198 Ky. 127, 248 S. W. 243 (1923). Of
course, if plaintiff makes due effort to get a doctor and fails, he cannot be
penalized. Gibson v. Midland V. R. Co., 117 Kan. 673, 233 Pac. 116 (1925)(semble). And the failure to secure a physician is immaterial if the plain-
tiff took the same measures that a competent doctor would have advised.
Allred v. Orth, 206 Cal. 494, 274 Pac. 955 (1929).
0 McIntosh v. A. T. & S. F. R. Co., 109 Kan. 246, 198 Pac. 1084 (1921)(dictum); City of Richmond v. Hill. 195 Ky. 566, 242 S. W. 867 (1922)(dictum).
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do so, will be deemed unreasonable." But a "major",' "danger-
ous 2  or "serious"" operation, especially where the results are
"problematical'"" involves so critical a choice between the danger
of the operation and the danger of the injury or the disease, that
most courts seem to hold as a matter of law that a refusal to under-
go such a danger is not ground for reducing damages. Whether,
and to what extent a person shall submit his body to physical
mutilation is so peculiarly personal that the law does not allow
a jury or court to decide this for the individual. "" A recent
commentator'7 pertinently suggests that as surgical science pro-
gresse.q and the results of operations become more predictable,
reasoL. oonduct may in future be held to require that the advice
of physicians be followed even as to serious operations.
3. Further limitations upon the doctrine: (a) One need never
take steps in advance to avoid the consequence of a future,
threatened wrong.
If a person of known firmness should threaten to commit a
tort, as for example a personal assault, against you, reasonable
prudence might well dictate that you should avoid for a time the
neighborhool where the threatener sojourns. But the law imposes
no such requirement upon you and, if pursuing your lawful oc-
casions undaunted by the threat, you are assaulted by the person
who made it, the doctrine of "avoidable consequences" will not
reduce your recovery." It is only damaging consequences of past
wrongful conduct, that must be avoided or minimized by the vic-
tim. The policy against aiding a wrongdoer to exert by a mere
threat pressure upon other persons to mold their conduct on his
desires, prevails over the policy of keeping economic losses at a
minimum." For instance, where the owners of a vessel could have
"Hendler Creamery Co. v. Miller, 153 Md. 264, 138 Atl. 1 (1927); Potts
v. Guthrie, 282 Pa. 200, 127 Atl. 605 (1925).
Stokes v. Long, 52 Mont. 470, 159 Pae. 28 (1916).
'1Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kerrick, 178 Ky. 486, 100 S. W. 44 (1918);
Wells v. Clark & Wilson Lumber Co., 114 Ore. 297, 235 Pac. 283 (1925).
"Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Boone, 180 Ky. 199, 202 S. W. 489 (1918).
"Kay v. Kansas City Pub. Service Co., 23 S. W. (2d) 1087 (Mo. App.,
1930).
Cero v. Oynesando, 138 Atl. 45, 46 (R. I., 1927).
'Comment in (1930) 14 M=N. LAW REv. 294 on Updegraff v. City of
Ottumwa, 226 N. W. 928 (Iowa, 1929).
"Plaintiff need not anticipate a wrong. 1 SEDwicK, DAMAGES (9th ed.,
1920) § 224, and cases in n. 50, 51, infra.
"1 In case of a threatened breach of contract somewhat different considera-
tions come into play. Such a threat, if it amounts to a repudiation does en-
title and require the other party to the contract, so far as he reasonably may,
to mold his conduct accordingly, so as not to enhance the damages. Clark
11
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avoided a threatened and unauthorized fumigation of the cargo
by a member of the Board of Health by unloading the vessel ahead
of time, failure of the owners to do so, does not reduce their dam-
ages. Similarly, a passenger who is entitled to ride to his
destination by virtue of his mileage book, when threatened with
ejection by the conductor unless he shall pay a fare, need not pay
the fare before being actually put off, but may act on the assump-
tion that the threat is a brutum fulme.' A federal court in 1918
decided that the captain of the Lusitania was justified in em-
barking on the fatal voyage despite the threats of the German
Government that the vessel was "liable to destruction" by sub-
marines."
Nuisance and continuing trespasses.
Does this doctrine that one need not anticipate a wrong apply
to cases of nuisances and trespasses of a continuing sort? It is
clear that it does apply in such cases so long as the defendant has as
yet done nothing at all except to threaten a nuisance or trespass.
The prospective victim need take no steps in advance to guard
against injury.' Suppose, however, that the defendant has estab-
lished a situation which results in a continuing nuisance or trespass.
As to past and completed invasions of his property, already caused
by the defendant, of course the plaintiff must do what he reason-
ably may to reduce the damage. But may he passively assume that
the defandant will desist from his unlawful conduct before further
harm results, even though it is apparent that defendant has no such
intention, and equally apparent that a slight and reasonable ex-
penditure of time, effort, and money by the plaintiff will avoid or
reduce the future damage? The broad generalization has fre-
quently been made that the doctrine which denies recovery for
avoidable consequences has no application to nuisance and other
continuing torts." It will be observed, however, that in most of
v. Marsiglia, supra 31. 19; 3 WILLSTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §§ 1298-1301.
RESTATEmFNT OF THE LAW OF CONTRA C S (Am. Law Inst. 1930) tentative
draft no. 8, § 327.
" Beers v. Board of Health, 35 La. Ann. 1132, 48 Am. Rep. 256 (1883).
Harvey v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 153 N. C. 567, 69 S. E. 627(1910).
The Lusitania, 251 Fed. 715 (S. D. N. Y., 1918).
Pluniner v. Penobscot Lumbering Ass'n., 67 Me. 363, 367 (1877) "'The
plaintiff *as not bound to take notice of the declared purpose of the com-
pany to swing a boom across the river. Such declaration imposed no addi-
tional duty upon him. Non cowtat that the wrongful act threatened would
be committed. It is sufficient for him if he exercised ordinary care in the
preservation of his logs after he had knowledge that the wrong was done."
1Champa v. Washington Compressed Gas Co., 146 Wash. 190, 262 Pao. 228(1927); American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Riverside Dairy & Stock Farm,
12
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the cases where this generalization has been made, the efforts, ex-
penditure, or sacrifice which the plaintiff would actually have had
to incur in order to avoid injury were such as could not reasonably
have been expected of a prudent person under the circumstances.
In one case, the owner of a dairy, whose pasture-land was being
poisoned by the smoke from defendant's smelter would have had to
shut down the dairy in order to avoid further injury if the nuisance
should continue.' Of course, it would be unreasonable to hold it in-
cumbent upon the owner to abandon the enterprise. In another,
the defendant's factory near the plaintiff's home emitted gas and
noxious odors so as to affect the health and comfort of the plaintiff.'
An instruction that plaintiff should have minimized damages "even
by removal from the premises, if necessary," was held erroneous,
but this result would likewise have followed from the rule that the
plaintiff was only required to take reasonable steps to avoid injury.
In still another recent case, 7 the defendant was unlawfully flowing
sewage into a stream which bisected plaintiff's farm. To prevent
his stock from being injured by drinking the polluted water, plain-
tiff would have had to divide his farm by fencing on each side of
the stream-obviously an unreasonable requirement. Undoubtedly
also, the deliberate and intentional, rather than merely inadvertent
or negligent character, of most continuing torts, naturally arouses
a feeling of indignation in the victim, and properly enters into the
consideration of how far the victim may be required to undergo
trouble and expense to avoid future injury which the defendant
could himself avoid by ceasing his wrongful conduct." On the
other hand, railway embankInents or city culverts causing over-
236 Fed. 510 (C. C. A. Utah, 1916); Johnston v. City of Galva, 316 Ill.
598, 147 N. E. 453, 38 A. L. R. 1384 (1925); City of Richmond v. Cheat-
wood, 130 Va. 76, 107 S. E. 830 (1921). So also as to continuing trespass.
Shannon v. McNabb, 29 Okla. 829, 120 Pac. 268, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 244(1911).
"American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Riverside Dairy & Stock Farm, sxpra
n. 54.
Champa v. Wash. Compressed Gas Co., supra n. 54.
" Galva v. City of Johnson, supra n. 54.
19 It is sometimes said that the doctrine of avoidable consequences does not
apply at all to cases of deliberate and intentional wrongs. Den Norske,
6tc., v. Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n., 226 N. Y. 1, 122 N. B. 463 (1919);
Champa v. Washington Compressed Gas Co., supra n. 54. While as above
indicated the wantonness of the wrong is a factor bearing upon the victim's
mental state, and what he may reasonably be expected to do, he should still
within reason be expected to avoid unnecessary harm. See CRANE, CASES ON
DAMAGES, note p. 128, citing Power Mfg. Co. v. Lindley, 296 S. W. 653
(Tex. Civ. App., 1927).
In Price v. High Shoals Mfg. Co., 132 Ga. 246, 64 S. E. 87 (1909) the
court, in an action by a lower against an upper owner for diverting water
from a stream to the detriment of plaintiff's mill, held that it was error to
13
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flows, factories polluting streams or the air, and other like nuisances
are themselves incidental to important civic or business enter-
prises, and until the particular condition has actually been decreed
to be unlawful it is often a matter of some doubt in advance of a
jury's finding, whether the plaintiff's rights have actually been in-
vaded, even though a damaging situation has been created. This
being so, it seems not improper to apply the usual rule and to hold
that where plaintiff knows that a continuing nuisance, or other
damaging situation, such as the pollution or diversion of a stream,
or a dam or enbankment threatening recurrent overflows, has been
created, the plaintiff cannot recover for injurious consequences
which by reasonable efforts, after the beginning of the wrong, he
could have prevented." This view finds strong support in a recent
Alabama case.' In that case a railway embankment was so con-
structed as to divert a stream so that it from time to time flooded
the.plaintiff's mine and greatly injured it. At a cost of $100 or
less, the plaintiff could have constructed a small levee which would
undoubtedly have caused the floods to flow away from the mine
and through a culvert under the embankment. The court denied
recovery for injury from floods which such a levee would have pre-
vented and said: "It is the legal duty of a party, threatened with
injury by conditions due to the wrongful act of another, to mini-
mize his damages. What is reasonably required depends upon the
extent of threatened injury as compared with the expense of
remedying the situation, and the practical certainty of success in
preventive effort."
Other obvious restrictions upon the application of the doc-
trine of "avoidable consequences" follow from the general limita-
tion that only reasonable conduct is required of the victim.' For
example, if plaintiff neither knows nor has reason to know of the
need for taking steps to avert damages, his failure to take such
steps will not prejudice him.' Clearly, likewise, if plaintiff is
charge on avoidable consequences, in view of a Georgia statute (Code 1895,§ 3802) which provided that the doctrine should not apply "in cases of posi-
tive and contumacious torts."
ISuch seems to be the prevailing view in cases of obstruction of streams.Louisville & N. Ry. Co. v. Moore, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 141, 101 S. W. 934, 10 L. R.A. (N. S.) 579 (1907) (overflowing of land caused by a railroad; ploughing
of a furrow by plaintiff would have avoided); Sweeny v. Montana C. Ry. Co.,19 Mont. 163, 47 Pac. 791 (1897) and other cases cited in note 22 L. R. A.(N. S.) 684. Compare Adams v. Clover Hill Farms, supra n. 28, which would
seem to support the same view.
0Mobile & 0. Ry. Co. v. Red River Coal Co., 119 So. 606, 609 (Ala., 1928).
See the next preceding section.
Clinchfield Coal Corporation v. Hayter, 130 Va. 711, 108 S. E. 854 (1921)(branding by defendant of trees on plaintiff's land; refusal to charge on
14
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financially unable to do what is necessary to minimize damages, the
rule does not apply.' Again, the plaintiff's failure to act to guard
against injury will not affect his recovery where such failure was
due to assurances given by the defendant himself." Moreover, the
victim cannot reasonably be expected, in order to minimize dam-
ages, to act unlawfully or in violation of his duties to third
persons.'
4. Must the victim comply with unjustifiable demands of the
wrongdoer, if this will minimize damage?
It sometimes appears in cases where the plaintiff sues for
breach of contract by defendant, or for violation of some duty owed
to plaintiff as a member of the public, that the defendant offered or
was willing to carry out a part of the bargain or duty upon modi-
fied terms. For example a defendant who has agreed to sell on
credit, offers to sell for cash. Again, a plaintiff is about to be
wrongfully ejected from a railway train because the conductor re-
fuses to believe that he has already surrendered his ticket, and the
plaintiff knows he can prevent his expulsion by paying his fare a
second time. If the plaintiff in the one case declines thus to reduce
his injury by dealing with the contract-breaker, or in the other de-
lines to submit to the railroad's unjustified exaction, can he re-
cover for damage which results, but which could have been fore-
stalled by such compliance? Realistic economic considerations
avoidable consequences in respect to plaintiff's failure to sell trees promptly,
where plaintiff did not know that branding would cause worms to injure trees,
defendant having assured him branding would not hurt them).
03W. B. Moses & Sons v. Lockwood, 54 App. D. C. 115, 295 Fed. 936
1924) (wrongful attachment of automobile, owner must secure possession by
iling bond unless financially unable to do so); Pratt Consol. Coal Co. v.
Vintson, 204 Ala. 185, 85 So. 502 (1920) (breach of contract to mine coal.
t, .... plaintiff could not have been required to build a spur track at a
cost of $400 or $500 .... unless he had the means to do so .... ").
O Clinchfield Coal Corporation v. Hayter, supra n. 62; Florence Fish Co.
v. Everett Packing Co., 111 Wash. 1, 188 Pac. 792 (1920) (breach of contract
to furnish boat to assist plaintiff in fishing; plaintiff not required to secure
boat elsewhere where defendant did not refuse, but repeatedly promised to
comply); Taylor v. Sturm Lumber Co., 90 W. Va. 530, 111 S. E. 481, 484
(1924) (Da~iages for breach of a logging contract, in that defendants de-
layed in taking logs. Plaintiff not required to build additional skidways where
defendant promised to relieve the delay); Kaufmann v. Delafield, 224 App.
Div. 29, 229 N. Y. Supp. 545 (1928) (plaintiff who might have sold stock
without loss may recover damages from retaining it on faith of defendant's
reassurances); Eastern Adv. Co. v. Shapiro, 263 Mass. 228, 161 X. E. 240
(1928) (plaintiff contracting to furnish bill boards, where advertiser failed
to furnish posters need not re-let space where advertiser said he would take
care of matter).
C 1 SEDOWICK, DAMAGES (9th ed., 1920) § 225. He need not commit a tres-
pass: Fairfield v. Salem, 213 Mass. 296, 100 N. E. 542 (1913); Wilson v.
Trexler, 106 S. C. 15, 90 S. E. 180 (1916). Nor a fraud: Hubbell v. Meigs, 50
15
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would prompt us to say to the plaintiff that he must do even this to
minimize his loss, but "red-blooded" emotional reactions all impel
us to the view that the plaintiff need not thus humiliate himself by
coming to new terms with one who has already violated his duty to
plaintiff. This conflict between realism and emotion finds reflec-
tion in the decisions, which reach varying results in the different
situations in which this problem presents itself. In the railroad
cases, where the second or additional fare is wrongfully demanded,
a minority of courts deny damages for expulsion to the passenger
who having the money available, fails to pay, but the majority and
the trend of the recent decisions is to the contrary.' Where the
seller of goods having agreed to deliver on credit, declines to abide
by his promise to extend credit but offers to deliver for cash, and
the buyer thereupon refuses to deal further with ihe seller, but
purchases the goods elsewhere at greater expense, is the buyer
limited in his damages to the loss he would have sustained if he had
submitted to the demand for cash? An eminent text-writer," sup-
ported by a few cases,' says yes. The greater number of courts
which Riave passed on the question say no.' The latter result is
N. Y. 480 (1872) (defrauded purchaser need not re-sell worthless stock, even
though by concealing its worthlessness he might have disposed of it). Nor a
breach of contract: Earl, Ch. 3., in Leonard v. N. Y. Etc. Tel Co., 41 N. Y.
554, 566 (1870) sited in SEDGWIOH, usupra. This principle seems to have been
erroneously disregarded in Western U. Tel. Co. v. Southwick, 214 S. W. 987(Tex. Civ. App. 1919). IA that case, "owing to mistake of defendant in
transmitting plaintiff's order, he became bound to a contract to sell land for$800 less than he intended and it was shown to be worth. The contract con-
tamined a liquidated damage clause, under which he could have been compelled
to pay, in event of his breach, only $500. His damages against the telegraph
company were held to be limited to $500, though he in fact performed. See
criticism, 33 HARv. LAw REv. 728. ' CRANE, CASES ON DAMAGES, p. 129, note.
66Creech v. Atlantic C. L. Ry Co., 174 N. C. 61, 93 S. B. 453, L. R. A.
1918 D 1030, and note; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sandlin, 209 Ky. 442, 279
S. W. 912 (1925); A. T. &T. F. Ry Co. v. Voxburg, 132 Okla. 196, 270 Pac.
58 (1928); DEOEEIN AL DIGESTS, title Carriers, §382 (5).
6 3 WILLiSTO, CONTRACTS, §1385; 2 WILLISTO, SALES (2d. ed. 1924)§599g. See also 1 SEDGwiox, DAmAGES (9th ed., 1920) §222.
6Lawrence v. Porter, 11 C. C. A. 27, 63 Fed. 62, 26 L. R. A. 167 (1894);
Payzn, Limited v. Saunders (1919) 2 X. B. 581; note, Obligation of Aggrieved
Contracting Party to Accept New Offer of Defaulter to Obviate Avoidable
Damage (1920) 33 HAZv. Tw REV. 854. See also Warren v. Stoddart, 105 U.
S. 224, 26 L. ed. 1117 (1881); Siegel v. Hirebshman, 187 App. Div. 548, 176
N. Y. Supp. 71 (1919).
"Coppola v. Marden, Orth, Hastings Co., 282 Ill. 281, 118 N. E. 499 (1917)
(" .... it comes with an ill grace from a party who has refused to perform
an agreement to demand that the other party who has not been at fault, should
do something contrary to the terms of the contract to mitigate or lessen the
damages resulting from the refusal to perform the contract."); Louis Cook
Mfg. Co. v. Randall, 62 Iowa 244, 17 N. W. 507 (1883); Frohlich v. Indep.
Glass Co., 144 Alich. 278, 107 N. W. 889 (1906); Coxe v. Anoka Waterworks
Co., 87 Minn 56, 91 N. W. 265 (1902).
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obviously correct, under any view, if the buyer is unable to secure
the cash,' or if the seller expressly or impliedly demands that the
buyer surrender his rights under the original contract7 1-a sacrifice
that the doctrine of avoidable consequences does not call upon him
to make. If the buyer is able to pay, and the seller does not insist
upon his surrending his right of action for the breach of the
promise to give credit, it would seem that business prudence would
require that he minimize damages, even by thus feeding from the
hand that has struck him. The refusal of most courts to reduce
damages accordingly may perhaps be defended on the supposition
that even among most business men of ordinary prudence, the be-
lief would prevail that, where credit promised is refused, the per-
son wronged may well fling away prudence and follow pride.
Some recent cases illustiate the wide range of situations where
the problem may arise. In an action in the federal court at New
Orleans a steamship line sought damages against a longshoremen's
union for breach of contract to unload a ship.' The men had de-
manded a higher rate of wage than the contract wage. The' court
held that for demurrage and delay which could have been avoided
by paying the increased rate the plaintiff could not recover. The
decision seems questionable in view of the probable effect that such
yielding might have upon future wage negotiations. In a Cali-
fornia case a vineyard owner had contracted for water with an
irrigation company and under the contract he was obligated to pay
fifty-eight dollars on September first. The company, however, some
months beforehand demanded that he pay the money in advance by
installments, one-half on February first, and one-half on July first,
and based the demand on a rule of the Railroad Commission, which
apparently had the function of regulating irrigation rates. The
plaintiff declined to do so and the company cut off the water until
payment should be made, and in consequence the plaintiff lost his
crop, worth several thousand dollars. The court pointed out that
the plaintiff by paying in advance would have suffered a loss of
only one dollar and fifty-three cents, the interest on the advance
payments, and it denied recovery for the loss of the grapes. It
said: "When there is such inconsequential difference between the
"Weber Impl. Co. v. Acme Harvester Mach. Co., 268 Mlo. 363, 187 S. W. 874
(1916), and see n. 63 ssura.
"Campfield v. Sauer, 111 C. C. A. 14, 189 Fed. 5-3, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 837
(1911); Everett v. Emmons Coal M. Co., 289 Fed. 686 (C. C. A., Ohio 1923).
2Nederlandsch, etc. v. Stevedores', etc., Society, 265 Fed. 397 (E. D. La.,
1920).
1 Severini v. Sutter Butte Canal Co., 59 Cal. App. 154, 210 Pac. 49 (1922).
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parties the law expects the one who has great interest at stake to
yield in order to save excessive damages and costs ..... The plain-
tiff may pride himself upon his firmness in insisting upon what he
conceived to be his rights, and he is entitled to whatever satisfac-
tion that may bring him, but the law does not permit such pride to
prevent the payment, although not due, of less than $2 in order to
save the loss of possibly thousands of dollars."
In Washington, the purchaser, under a conditional sales con.
tract of a dairy sued for damages for conversion by the seller of
the personal property used in operating the dairy. Among other
claims he sought damages for the interruption of the business and
loss of profits. The defendant had offered to return the personal
property to the plaintiff if the latter would pay all the agreed in-
stallments in cash, less a six per cent discount, at once. He con-
tended that the plaintiff could and should have accepted this offer
and thereby have avoided the interruption of the business. The
court overruled this contention and sustained a verdict for the lost
profits of the business, and said: "We do not think that Seeley
was under any obligation to put himself out to that extent in order
to minimize or do away with the damages suffered by him. It was
not a question of Seeley paying out a small sum or slightly incon-
veniencing himself with a view of minimizing his damages. It was
a question of submitting himself to an entirely new contract sought
to be forced upon him by Peabody, to the end that Peabody might
avoid the damaging results of his own unwarranted act.''
It is suggested that the matter is not reducible to a rule that
the doctrine of avoidable consequences always, or never, requires
submission to unjustified demands or acceptance of offers which
modify the original obligation, tendered by the party at fault.
Even economic realism must take account of the human distaste for
concessions or further dealings with one who has dealt unjustly, and
where the interests at stake are not too large, it may well be deemed
reasonable to wash one's hands of the wrongdoer and decline to
traffic further with him even to minimize damages. But where a
"hands-off" policy dictated by indignation or resentment would
imperil interests of a magnitude out of all proportion to the slight
humiliation which might proceed from the concession, then the per-
son aggrieved should be required to swallow his pride and co-
operate with the wrongdoer in reducing the loss.'
11 Seeley v. Peabody, 139 Wash. 382, 247 Pac. 471, 475, rehearing denied, 141
Wash. 696, 250 Pac. 469 (1926).
'7 In the recent Oklahoma case of Key v. Kingwood Oil Co., 110 Okla. 178,
236 Pac. 598 (1924) this dilemma was presented in striking fashion. Key was
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1931], Art. 2
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol37/iss4/2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
5. Benefit to victim from wrongdoer's breachi of duty.
Closely akin to, but not entirely identical with, the doctrine of
avoidable consequences is the principle that in arriving at damages
for defendant's wrongful conduct, if any benefit or opportunity
for benefit appears to have accrued to the plaintiff by reason of de-
fendant's breach of duty, a balance must be struck between benefit
and loss, and the defendant should be charged only with the dif-
ference-the net loss.'
This principle is illustrated in cases of damage to land. It is
a trespass for the defendant to pile dirt on plaintiff's land, or to dig
drains therein without authority, but in arriving at damages in
each instance the resulting benefit will be off-set against the in-
jury.'
It is constantly applied in contract cases as a necessary corol-
lary of the fundamental canon that the damages, as near as may be,
should be such as will put the plaintiff in the position he would
have been in if the contract had been fully performed. If it was in-
eumbent upon plaintiff to undergo expense in performing cove-
nants or conditions before he should be entitled to full performance
by defendant, then if plaintiff before performing himself, sues for
defendant's failure to perform, plaintiff is saved the expense of
performance. Consequently, he recovers the value of defendant's
promised performance but from that must be deducted the cost
which plaintiff would have been put to in carrying out his part of
the bargain."8 This is well exemplified in the case of construction
drilling for oil. The Kingwood Company had agreed to furnish natural gas
to Key for this drilling operation at $25 per day and did so until Key had
drilled down to "pay" sand. At this juncture, the Company demanded $30
per day for gas, and shut off the supply when Key declined to pay this. Key
shut down the well, being unable to get gas elsewhere immediately and sued for
the damage to the well from the shut-down, which he alleged at $10,000. The
trial court directed a verdict against Key, but the court on appeal held that the
question was whether Key's conduct in refusing compliance with the company's
demand was reasonable and that this question should have been submitted to
the jury.
70 While this principle is one of general application, it is not without ex-
ceptions. Thus, in actions for death or personal injuries, the wrong-doer can-
not claim credit for the benefit accruing to the plaintiff from life or accident
insurance policies. Again, in some states, where a landlord sues a tenant for
the rent of premises wrongfully vacated the tenant cannot claim credit for the
amount for which the landlord might have re-rented the premises.
7 Mayo v. Springfield, 138 Mass. 70 (1884) (piling dirt) ; Burtraw v. Clark,
103 Mich. 383, 61 N. W. 552 (1894) (drain); 1 SEDGIvCK DAMAGES (9th ed.
1920) §63.
3 WILISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §1350. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RE-
STATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (Am. Law Inst. 1930) tentative draft
No. 8, §326.
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contracts, repudiated by the owner before completion of the work.
The contractor recovers the contract price less what it would have
cost him to complete the job.
Another familiar example is the rule which requires the seller
who sues the buyer for breach of his contract to accept the goods,
to credit against the contract price the market value of the goods.
In other words, if title has not passed and the article has not been
delivered, the plaintiff recovers the excess only of the contract price
above the amount which the plaintiff can secure elsewhere for such
goods.' To earn the full price he would have had to deliver goods
of a certain value, and defendant's breach has relieved him from
parting with that value, and enables him to realize upon it by a sale
to others. He should therefore credit what others will pay, which
is what he has gained by the breach. If a seller has not made such
a gain by the breach, due to exceptional circumstances, then the re-
sult should be different. For example, an automobile dealer sues a
customer for refusal to carry out a contract to purchase a car. The
market value of a new car is the fixed standard retail price of that
model, but defendant's breach has not increased the possibility of
finding a new customer for such a car. From the agent's point of
view the supply of new cars from the factory is unrestricted but
the supply of new customers is strictly limited. Finding a cus-
tomer is not simply a matter of offering the article upon a ready
and practically unlimited market, as it is in the case of wheat, cot-
ton, or the like. It requires elaborate advertising, expensive
demonstrations, and continued solicitation. The plaintiff recovers,
then, the agreed price less what he has really been saved, that is,
less the cost of the car from the factory.'
Finally, the most obvious and frequent instance of the applica-
tion of this principle is in cases of contracts of one person to devote
his personal services exclusively for all or part of his time during
a given period, to a certain employment for another. When the
employer wrongfully terminates the service, and is sued therefor by
the person employed, the latter must give credit for what he
earned elsewhere, or with reasonable diligence might have earned
elsewhere, during the contract period.' But for the breach, plain-
tiff could not have secured the other employment.
7McGrew v. Ide Estate Investment Co., 106 Kan. 348, 187 Pac. 887 (1920);
6 PAGE, CONTRACTS (2d ed., 1922) § 3215.
'0 2 WILLISTON, SALES (2nd ed. 1924) § 599.
Torkomian v. Russell, 90 Conn. 481, 97 At]. 760 (1916) ; Stewart v. Hansen,
62 Utah 281, 218 Pac. 959 (1923) ; BERRY, AUTOMOBILES (6th ed. 1929) § 1737.
See § 6 herein, dealing with damages in employment contracts.
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6. If in case of a breach of contract by defendant, there becomes
available to plaintiff an advantage which would have been
available to him even if the contract with the defendant lad
been carried out, then the defendant is not be credited with
such advantage.
As has just been seen where a contract of B to work exclusively
for A is repudiated by A, such repudiation has made it possible for
B to seek other employment during the contract period which
would not otherwise have been open to him. If B finds such em-
ployment or could have done so, A is entitled to credit for what was
or might have been thus earned. Similarly, if it were a contract
to work exclusively for A in the mornings only, with no inhibition
on working elsewhere at other times in the day, here it would seem
that if A repudiates and B secures or might secure other morning
employment, B must give credit therefor, but not if he secures other
employment in the afternoons, for this he might have done even
though B had not discharged him.' If the contract is for part-
time personal services not allocated to any particular times or
hours, then it would seem that the employer could not claim credit
for any earnings for work done elsewhere, or available elsewhere,
unless and only so far as he can show, that it would have trenched
upon the time necessary for the original employment.' If the con-
tract is one that does not require B's personal service in the actual
performance of it, but permits B to employ others to do the work,
then obviously no credit can be claimed by A, when he repudiates
the contract, for earnings thereafter made by B from other
sources.' B could have made these earnings if A had not freed him
by repudiation from the obligation to carry out the contract with
A. Consequently, it often becomes material to determine whether
contracts of many different sorts call for the personal services of
the party who sues for its breach. 'While obviously in contracts of
almost any type the exclusive personal services of a party may be
stipulated for, the typical contracts of the following kinds (when
made with "contractors" rather than laborers) usually do not so
provide, and consequently usually do not entail reduction of dam-
See A.lgeyer v. Rutherford, 45 S. W. 628 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898) (night
earnings after discharge do not go in reduction of damages for wrongful dis-
charge, where employee could have worked elsewhere at night without interfer-
ing with employment from which he was discharged).
Galveston County v. Ducie, 91 Tex. 665, 45 S. W. 798 (1898) (county
physician, with understanding that he could take private practice); Jaffray v.
King, 34 Md. 217 (1870) (city salesman, not required to give his full time to
the business).
' See the extensive note (1921) 15 A. L. R. 751.
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ages for earnings elsewhere; contracts for construction," logging,'
teaming and hauling,' mining,' and manufacturing." It is true
that all this class of contracts do contemplate and require for their
performance the expenditure of extensive human efforts and serv-
ices. The point is, however, that it is understood and agreed that the
person or corporation undertaking the work will carry it out by
employing other persons-any other persons the contractor may
choose-to do the actual labor of high and low degree. Theoret-
ically at least, the contractor could, in addition to and along with
the particular contract, carry on an indefinite number of similar
contracts. Consequently, if the particular contract is repudiated
by the other person, the latter should take no credit for profits
earned or earnable by the contractor on other jobs. On the other
hand, it is equally clear that in carrying out the particular con-
tract it would ordinarily be necessary for the contractor, if an in-
dividual, to expend valuable time in supervising the work, or if a
corporation to employ the time of its officers in supervision. In
suing for damages for the frustration of the contract, it must, as
we have seen," give credit for any costs which it would have in-
curred in completing the contract. A proper reckoning must in-
clude among those costs the value of the time of the contractor" or
the supervising agents," unless it should appear that the shut-down
of the work on this contract has necessarily caused the contractor,
if an individual, to remain idle, or if a corporation, to pay its
officers without having work for them to do." Thus, our principle
of credit for benefits to plaintiff from defendant's wrong reappears
in another form, in the form of credit for the saving of the time of
plaintiff through the abandonment of the contract.
This distinction between a contract calling for the exclusive per-
sonal services of the contractor himself, and a contract for the com-
pletion of work which may be done by the contractor through others
Olds v. Mapes-Reeve Constr. Co., 177 Mass. 41, 58 N. E. 478 (1900).
"Allen v. Murray, 87 Wis. 41, 57 N. W. 979 (1894).t mMount Pleasant Stable Co. v. Steinberg, 238 Mass. 567, 131 N. E. 295, 15
A. L. R. 749 (1921), CRANE, CASES ON DAMAGES 113; Harmount & Woolf Tie
Co. v. Skinner, 232 Ky. 630, 24 S. W. (2d) 262 (1930).
81 Harness v. Kentucky Flour Spar Co., 149 Ky. 65, 147 S. W. 934, Ann. Cas.
1914 A, 803 (1912).
10 Crescent Mfg. Co. v. Nelson Mfg. Co., 100 Mo. 325, 13 S. W. 503 (1889).
1See n. 78, supra.
2Columbus Mining Co. v. Ross, 218 Ky. 98, 290 S. W. 1052, 50 A. L. R. 1394
(1927), with note.
3Des Allemands Lumber Co. v. Morgan City Timber Co., 117 La. 1, 41 So.
332 (1905).
"See comment of the learned annotator, (1927) 50 A. L. R. 1397, 1399.
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is illustrated by the facts of a recent North Carolina case,' wherein
it is believed that the distinction was not observed by the court. In
that case a corporation, the Durham Construction Company, con-
tracted to superintend the construction of a building for defendant
and to buy the material therefor and keep account of the laborers'
time, all for a commission of seven per cent of the cost of
material and labor. It was contemplated that the supervision
should be done by the two active members of the corporation who
were experienced in construction work. The defendant refused to
permit the plaintiff to carry out the contract, and the plaintiff sues
for the profits it lost thereby. The court, relying on the fact that
the services of the two members of the plaintiff corporation were
contemplated and contracted fQr, held that in assessing the damages
the jury ought to have been instructed to deduct from the contract
price not only the expenses of performance, but also thb amount
that it would have earned during the contract period in such other
employment as it could have secured by the exercise of proper dili-
gence. It is believed that the court overlooked the fact that exclu-
sive employment of the corporation or its members on defendant's
work was not contemplated, that plaintiff could have carried on de-
fendant's work and other jobs at the same time, and that all that
defendant was entitled to was that in computing the net profit of
which plaintiff was deprived, the value of the time of the members
of the plaintiff corporation which would have been expended on this
work, should be counted as a part of the cost of completion.
The present problem is frequently presented in connection with
contracts for the farming of land on shares, a type of arrangement
which is especially prevalent in the South. If the share-cropper is
wrongfully prevented by the landlord from carrying out the con-
tract, is the landlord, when sued by the cropper for damages for the
breach, entitled to credit for what the cropper earns or could earn
in similar operations on other land available in the vicinity? Here
again the answer depends upon the terms of the contract. If its
terms contemplate that the cropper must personally devote all or a
given portion of his time and services to the care of the particular
crops, then the landlord is entitled to credit for earnings which the
cropper earns or can earn elsewhere in the vicinity in similar opera-
tions and which he could not have earned if the original contract
had been performed." This is most frequently the effect of such
15 Durham Construction Co. v. Wright, 189 N. C. 456, 127 S. E. 580 (1925).
"T. L. Farrow Mercantile Co. v. Riggens, 14 Ala. App. 529, 71 So. 936
(1915); Somers v. Musolf, 86 Ark. 97, 109 S. W. 1173 (1908); Crews v.
Cortez, 102 Tex. 111, 113 S. W. 523, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 713 (1908).
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contracts. On the other hand, if the share-cropper's contract is
sinply for the making of the crop and he is not required by its
terms to devote any definite part of his own time to the work, then
since the abandonment of the contract has not freed him for other
work, since he was never tied-then the landlord is entitled to no
such credit. 7
Analogous considerations come into play in cases of breaches of
contracts by advertisers. When the advertiser fails to take space
contracted for in the newspaper, magazine, street-car, or the like,
the question arises, has the advertiser been assigned certain par-
ticular space by the contract.? If not, has the publisher or person
letting the advertising only a limited amount of such space avail-
able so that when the particular advertiser cancels, the other party's
opportunity to sell advertising is thereby increased? If either of
these questions is answered yes, then the space freed by the adver-
tiser's breach must be re-let if it can be by reasonable efforts, and
the advertiser must be given credit for the proceeds which have
been or could have been thus realized when damages against him
are assessed. 8 On the other hand, if as is usually the case, the ad-
vertiser merely contracts to use a certain amount of space generally,
and the publisher or advertising agency can expand the space avail-
able indefinitely to meet the demands of other customers, then the
advertiser's default has resulted in no benefit to the seller of space
and no credit for similar space sold to others should be allowed.9 '
A recent federal case1& ' presents a close and interesting ques-
tion of the application of this principle of credit for benefits. The
contractor agreed to install a sprinkler system in a factory.
The owner of the factory, when the sprinkler installation
Wendt v. Smith, 50 Cal. App. 233, 194 Pac. 736 (1921). Compare Bankers'
Trust Co. v. Schulze, 220 S. W. 570 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), affirmed 236 S. W.
703 (Tex. Comm. App. 1922).
"Tradesman Co. v. Superior Mfg. Co., 147 Mich. 702, 706, 111 N. W. 343,
112 N. W. 708 (1907) ("124 inches on inside front page cover" of weekly
paper); Barron G. Collier v. Womens' Garment Store, 152 Minn. 475, 189 N.
W. 403 (1922). But the advertising agent need not re-let the vacant space at
less than the regular rates. Barron G. Collier v. Kindy, 146 Minn. 279, 178 N.W. 584 (1920) ; Western Grain Co. v. Barron G. Collier, 163 Ark. 369, 258 S. W.
979, 35 A. L. R. 1534 (1924). Nor need he make special efforts to induce his
customers to take the vacated space rather than other space which he has avail-
able for sale. Ware Bros. Co. v. Cortland Cart & Carriage Co., 210 N. Y. 122,
103 N. E. 890 (1913). The burden is on the advertiser to show that the lessor
could have disposed of the space, though the proof about this matter would
seem more readily available to the other party. Ware Bros. Co. v. Cortland
Car & Carriage Co., supra.
9Barron G. Collier v. Kindy, supra n. 98; J. K. Rishel Furniture Co. v.
Stuyvesant Co., 123 Misc. 208, 204 N. Y. Supp. 659 (1924).1' Grinnell Co., Inc. v. Voorhees, I F. (2d) 693 (C. C. A., X. J. 1924).
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was only three-fourths completed, became bankrupt. Bankruptcy
is, in effect, a repudiation of the bankrupt's contracts. The
factory was sold in the bankruptcy administration to a new
owner. The contractor instituted a claim against the bank-
rupt's estate for the profit which it would have made if the
original contract had been carried to completion. In answer to
this claim, it was shown that the contractor had made a new con-
tract with the new owner of the factory for the completion of this
same sprinkler system, and that under this, he had made the same
profit that he would have secured from the completion of the work
under the original contract. This contention prevailed in the lower
court, but the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision, and
allowed the claim for profit lost. It held that the "duty to mitigate
damages" applies only in cases of personal service contracts and
cases where the subject matter of the contract is in the possession
of the plaintiff. It is manifest, however, that the profit that the
contractor earned by completing the work under the contract with
the new purchaser, is one that he could by no possibility have made
if the original contract had been fully performed, and it is arguable
that if the court had considered the principle of credit for benefits
rather than confining its attention to the cognate doctrine of avoid-
able consequences, it might have found itself in agreement with the
trial judge."
7. Recovery for expeivse or injury incurred in efforts to minimize
loss.
The law serves its end of fostering the conservation of the
human and material resources of the community, and discouraging
unnecessary waste, in two ways. The first way, that of denying re-
covery for avoidable damage, we have covered in the earlier part of
this chapter. Correlative and complementary to this is the device
of encouraging the injured party to avert loss by allowing him to
recover for expense or injury incurred in the course of his efforts
in that direction." Just as we saw that the negative side of the
doctrine of avoidable consequences denied recovery only when the
loss could have been prevented by reasonable effort, so here also the
law gives recovery for expense or injury only where incurred as a
m± See comment on the case in (1925) 34 YAI.E L. J. 553.
102 Morrison v. Queen City Electric Light & Power Co., 193 Mich. 604, 160
N. W. 434 (1916) ; Den Norske, etc. v. Sun Printing & Pub. Asso., 226 N. Y.
1, 122 N. E. 463 (1919); DECENNmA DIGESTs, DAmAGES, §§ 42-46, 117, 208
(5); 1 SEDGWicK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1920) §§226a-226o; CoNTRACTs RESTATE-
uENT (Am. L. Inst. 1930); § 327 (2).
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part of endeavors which are reasonable and prudent." The amount
of the expenditure must likewise be reasonable,"' but the fact that
the plaintiff has actually paid the money is prima facie evidence
that the outlay is a reasonable one.'
Among the familiar instances of the application of the doc-
trine are the recovery of reasonable expense for medical and sur-
gical attendance, nursing, and drugs incurred by the plaintiff in
alleviating a personal injury inflicted by defendant ;" the recovery
of similar expenses in the care of animals injured," and the allow-
ance of the cost of recovering, repairing, or protecting property
damaged by defendant's wrong.' Likewise, as damages for breach
of contract, the plaintiff may, if the threatened injury were reason-
ably foreseeable by the defendant when the contract was made,"
recover the cost of prudent efforts to avert or reduce such threat-
ened loss.' ° Such efforts may include the expense of securing a
substitute for defendant's performance which has failed. For ex-
ample, where the seller of timber agreed that he would erect a saw-
mill on the land and plane the timber at a certain rate, but failed
to do so, the buyer was held entitled to recover the expense of haul-
ing the timber to another saw-mill.' Again, when a sub-contractor
"3Northern Supply Co. v. Wangard, 123 Wis. 1, 100 N. W. 1066 (1904)
(plaintiff placed decayed potatoes, furnished by defendant, with good ones;
instead of removing them at once, he sorted the good from the bad from time
to time; held, an unreasonable method of trying to save them, and the expense
of sorting not recoverable); Le Blanche v. London & N. W. Ry., L. R. I C.
P. Div. 286 (1876) (plaintiff who by defendant's fault had missed a connec-
tion engaged a special train which got him to destination only an hour earlier
than next regular train; held, expense of special train not recoverable).
1" Tuchy v. Columbia Steel Co., 61 Ore. 527, 122 Pac. 36 (1912) (no recovery
for expenses for medical treatment without showing of reasonableness).
'w Hachne Ditch Co. v. John Flood Ditch Co., 76 Colo. 500, 233 Pac. 167
(1925) (cost of procuring substitute outlet for water which defendant agreed
to permit to flow through its ditch); Alt v. Konkle, 237 Mich. 264, 211 N. W.
661 (1927) (medical expenses).
wAlt v. Konkle, supra n. 105; Dreyfus & Co. v. Wooters, 123 Va. 42, 96
S. E. 235 (1918).
'"Even when the injury eventually proves incurable, and the animal worth-
less, so that the owner recovers its full value, he may in addition recover the
reasonable expense of prudent efforts to effect a cure. Central Texas Telephone
Co. v. -Almand, 246 S. W. 676 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922). See also note 123, infra.0s Republic Iron & Steel Co. v. Norris, 25 Ga. App. 809, 104 S. E. 921 (1920) ;
Freeman v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 101 Kan. 516, 167 Pac. 1062 (1917) (ex-
pense of recovering cattle escaped due to defendant's defective cattle-guard) ;
Stubbs v. Molborget, 108 Wash. 89, 182 Pac. 936, 6 A. L. R. 318 (1919) (cost
of repairs to automobile); St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 161 Ark. 140, 255
S. W. 553 (1923) (cost of repairs made by consignee on freight damaged in
transit).
"'0Hadey v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Reprints 145 (1854); RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, supra n. 102.
no Nunnally Co. v. Bromberg & Co., 217 Ala. 180, 115 So. 230 (1928).
n"Gilliland v. Hawkins, 216 Ala. 97, 112 So. 454 (1927).
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delayed in putting glass in the windows of a building, and it be-
came necessary for the principal contractor to put muslin in the
windows to protect the interior until the glass could be installed,
the expense of this was recovered from the sub-contractor. 2
Similarly, where one who leased premises was put to the necessity
of erecting partitions and making other changes essential to enable
him to occupy the premises, by reason of the lessor's failure to de-
liver all of the space contracted for, the court held that such ex-
pense so far as it was a reasonable outlay made to minimize dam-
ages was a proper element of recovery against the lessor.
Not only may expense be allowed, but if one reasonably en-
deavoring to escape or minimize the injurious effects of a wrong,
sustains injury to person or property in the effort, he may recover
for such injury as an item of damages flowing from the wrong. Ac-
cordingly, where a person who has sustained a personal injury
selects with reasonable care a physician to treat his injury, and
such physician through mistake or negligence inflicts a further in-
jury upon the patient the original wrongdoer is liable for this added
injury too.' Similar considerations apply when the plaintiff to
avoid the effects of a fire negligently caused by defendant, sets a
back-fire and thereby burns his own property, or sustains personal
injury in fighting the fire. " Likewise, cases are frequent where
railway passengers who are wrongfully ejected before reaching
their destinations, or are taken past it, and who sustain injuries in
attempting to escape the effects of exposure by seeking a place of
shelter. With fair uniformity the courts allow these injuries, in-
cident to such attempts, to be compensated as an element of
damages." 7
2Elias v. Wright, 276 Fed. 908 (C. C. A., N. Y., 1921).
"'Nunnally Co. v. Bromberg & Co., supra n. 110.
"' Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Hill, 237 U. S. 208, 35 S. Ct. 575, 59 L. ed. 918
(1915) ; Flint v. Conn. Hassam Paving Co., 92 Conn. 576, 103 Atl. 840 (1918) ;
Suelzer v. Carpenter, 183 Ind. 23, 107 N. E. 467 (1915) ; Smith v. Missouri K.
& T. Ry. Co., 76 Okla. 303, 185 Pac. 70 (1919). The cases are collected in a
note (1918) 8 A. L. R. 506.
15 McKenna v. Baessler, 86 Iowa 197, 53 N. W. 103, 17 L. R. A. 310 (1892).
11 Wilson v. Cent. of Ga. Ry., 132 Ga. 215, 63 S. E. 1121 (1909); CRANE,
CASES oN DAUAGES, 55; Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Siler, 229 Ill. 390, 82 N. E.
362, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 819, 11 Ann. Cas. 368 (1907) ; Berg v. Great Northern
Ry. Co., 70 Minn. 272, 73 N. W. 648, 68 Am. St. Rep. 524 (1897) ; Wilson v.
Northern Pae. Ry. Co., 30 N. D. 456, 153 N. W. 429, L. R. A. 1915 E, 991
(1915).
"' Yazoo & M. V. Ry. Co. v. Aden, 77 Miss. 382, 27 So. 385 (1900); Schu-
maker v. St. Paul & D. R. Co., 46 Minn. 39, 48 N. W. 559, 12 L. R. A. 257
(1891); contra: Fowlks v. Southern Ry. Co., 96 Va. 742, 32 S. E. 464 (1899).
A similar holding was made in a case where failure to deliver a telegram re-
sulted in plaintiff's inability to secure a railway ticket and he suffered from ex-
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While there are decisions to the contrary, the better opinion
would seem to be that under the present principle the plaintiff may
properly claim as an item of damages the value of his own personal
time and services expended in prudent efforts to reduce the loss
resulting from defendant's wrongdoing'
The principle of credit for benefits, discussed in the next pre-
vious section, has some interesting applications in cases where the
party wronged undergoes expense for the purpose of lessening the
injury. It sometimes happens where defendant has failed to per-
form a contract, that the substitute secured by plaintiff is more
valuable than the defendant's performance would have been.
Clearly he cannot charge defendant then for the whole cost of the
substitute, or if he does the defendant must have credit for the
difference in value between the substitute and the thing promised."
Similarly, in a North Dakota case the defendant who had promised
to thresh the plaintiff's flax, delayed in doing so, and this made it
necessary for the plaintiff to stack the flax for its protection. The
plaintiff sued for the cost of stacking, but it appeared that the
stacking would greatly lessen the cost of threshing, and conse-
quently it was held that this saving of ultimate expense in thresh-
ing should be deducted from plaintiff's claim for the cost of
stackdng.'
Naturally enough, the courts do not require unerring foresight
in one who seeks to avoid or minimize damage. We have seen that
he is held to no more than reasonable prudence, in determining
whether he is barred from recovering avoidable damages.' If they
were avoidable only by extraordinary efforts or acumen, he is not
barred. Likewise, if the expedient by which it is claimed the
plaintiff might have lessened the injury was apparently of such
debatable efficacy that a reasonable man might either have adopted
it or not, if plaintiff does not adopt it, his right of recovery is not
diminished. In this latter case where a reasonable person in the
posure in walking to his destination. Barnes v. W. U. Tel. Co., 27 Nev. 438, 76
Pac. 931, 65 L. R. A. 666 (1904)
Mitchell v. Burch, 36 Ind. 529, CRANE, CASFS ON DAmAGES, 326 (1871);
(plaintiff's time spent in hunting for his hogs, proper item of damages in
action for their detention); St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Sharp, 27 Kan. 134
(1882) (value of plaintiff's services in driving out intruding cattle, recover-
able). Contra: Spencer v. Murphy, 6 Colo. 453, 41 Pac. 841 (1895) (ser-
vices in putting out fire). See 1 SEDGwIcx, DAUAGE (9th ed., 1920) § 226L
Compare n. 92, supra.
2"Erie Co. N. G. & F. Co., Ltd. v. Carroll, (1911) A. 0. 105. See 1
SEDGWICK, op cit, supra n. 118., § 226h, criticising an earlier English case of
a contrary tenor.
Paulson v. Sorenson, 33 N. D. 488, 157 N. W. 473 (1916).
See § 2, supra.
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light of the situation before him, might either have undertaken the
expense of attempting to lessen injury or might have decided
against doing so, if the plaintiff does decide to incur such expense,
he may recover it from defendant. An unusual recent New York
case furnishes a striking illustration. During the Great War, the
defendant newspaper published a false statement that the plaintiff,
the Norwegian owner of a line of vessels, had falsified certain ship-
ping documents to enable it to transport a large supply of copper
to Norway so that it might later find its way to the Central Powers,
with whom we were at war. In an effort to minimize the damage
to its business and credit from this report the plaintiff at a cost of
,$2,722 published denials in various newspapers. The court held
that, conceding that a failure by plaintiff to publish such denials
would not have been a ground for denying recovery for damages
suffered which could thus have been avoided, the publication was
nevertheless a reasonable expedient for the purpose of lessening the
injury and the defendant was liable for the expense.' Moreover,
since the plaintiff's conduct is to be judged only from the stand-
point of one reasonably trying to exercise foresight, and not by the
standard of "hind-sight" after the event, the plaintiff may re-
cover the costs of prudent attempts to reduce damages, even though
such efforts prove unsuccessful.'
A doctrine that "expenses" of minimizing loss may be re-
covered, suggests that costs do not become "expenses" until they
have been paid, and defendants sometimes seek to escape liability
on this ground. It is well settled, however, that if the plaintiff has
become legally liable for a given service, as for example for doctors'
charges, he may recover the cost just as readily as if he had paid
it."' It is occasionally declared, however, that such costs may not
be recovered unless the plaintiff has either paid or become liable to
IDen Norske, etc,, v. Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n., 226 N. Y. 1, 122 N. E.
463 (1919), CRAN, CASES ON DAMrAGES, 122.
' Thus, a client whose attorney negligently advised the purchase of a lease-hold which proved to be umnarketable, attemptd to clear the title by bringing
suit to validate the lease, but the suit failed. The court, nevertheless, held that
the client in an action against the attorney could recover the expense of the
abortive suit, which had been prudently undertaken. Ninth Ave. and 42nd St.
Corp. v. Zimmerman, 217 App. Div. 498, 217 N. Y. Supp. 123 (1926). And
money reasonably spent in seeking to cure an injured horse, though it prove
useless, is recoverable, in addition to the value of the horse. Southern Eard-
ware & Supply Co. v. Standard Equipment Co., 158 Ala. 596, 48 So. 357(1909); Central Texas Telephone Co. v. Allmand, supra n. 107.
" Alabama Power Co. v. Edwards, 219 Ala. 162, 121 So. 543 (1929) (medical
services); Menefee v. Raisch Improvement Co., 78 Cal. App. 785, 248 Pae. 1031(1926) (cost of repairs of automobile). But if plaintiff has merely become
liable he should so aliege, and should not plead that he has paid it. Fisk v.
Poplin, 46 Cal. App. 587, 189 Pac. 722 (1920).
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pay them.' There seems little reason to support such a generaliza-
tion. On the contrary, if certain services are necessary to lessen
plaintiff's damages, and third persons are willing to perform them
gratuitously for the plaintiff, such willingness seems no ground for
permitting the defendant to escape liability for an item of damage
for which he would normally be responsible, namely the amount
which such a service would ordinarily cost.' In addition, the gen-
eralization does not take account of the frequently occurring situa-
tion where it is apparent that as a result of the defendant's com-
pleted wrong, it will become necessary in future for plaintiff to
make outlays for the purpose of preventing greater damage. With-
out doubt where the reasonable certainty of their future occurrence
can be established, such prospective expenses may be recovered in
advance as part of the complete damages for the wrong.' Finally,
even if the time for making the outlay has past, but the expense was
one that was reasonably required to prevent a greater loss, and the
plaintiff failed to make the expenditure but submitted to the
greater and avoidable loss, the plaintiff may still recover for the
expense that it would have been necessary to incur in order to hold
the damage to a minimum. This was the holding in an Arkansas
case where the defendant in flooding his rice field inundated the
plaintiff's land and ruined his crop of hay, a result which plaintiff
could have prevented at reasonable expense. The court held that
while the plaintiff could not recover for the hay, he could recover
the amount that it would have cost to protect it. "In other words,"
the court said, "the reasonable cost of the means which the injured
party is bound to adopt to lessen the damages, whether adopted or
not, wM measure the compensation he can recover for the injury or
the part of it that such means have or would have prevented"
"Wicks v. Cuneo-Henneberry Co., 319 Ill. 344, 150 N. E. 276 (1926)(medical expense). In Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Quallis, 120 Okla 49, 250 Pac.
774 (1926) the court, accepting this as the rule as to personal injuries, held
that it did not apply to the case of damage to an automobile. In such case
the court held that the amount which it would reasonably cost to repair could
be recovered, though the repairs were not made.
'=Roth v. Chatlos, 97 Conn. 282, 116 AtI. 332, 22 A. L. R. 1554 (1922).
Seeing Denver Co. v. Morgan, 66 Colo. 565, 185 Pae. 339 (1919) (pros-
pective medical expense); Bryant v. Kansas City Rys. Co., 218 S. W. 955 (Mo.
App., 1920) (artificial limbs); Work v. Philadelphia Supply Co., 95 N. J.
Law 193, 112 Atl. 185 (1920) (prospeetive medical expense).
"Lisko v. Uhren, 134 Ark. 430, 204 S. W. 101 (1918). Compare Curtner
v. Bank of Jonesboro, 175 Ark. 539, 299 S. W. 994 (1927) where the purchaser
of land lost a profit of $1,000 on a resale by reason of not having an abstract,
wnich the original seller had agreed to furnish. It was held that since he
could have secured an abstract himself for $65, he could only recover that
amount against the original seller. Compare 1 SUTHEriAND, DAMAGES (4th
ed. 1916) § 88..
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This last holding tends to support the view expressed in the
first section of this article that the so-called "duty to minimize
damages" is not a duty in any strict or technical sense. It would
be hard to support the recovery of an amount which it was the
plaintiff's duty to expend, but which in violation of that duty he
failed to pay out. It is believed that our survey of doctrine of
avoidable consequences has made it clear that the law is here trying
to influence men's conduct toward the avoidance of loss and waste
by a carefully devised plan of allocating certain risks to the party
wronged if he fails in such a standard of conduct. Likewise, it re-
wards him correspondingly if he measures up to this standard by
apportioning the risk upon the wrongdoer of the expense of the
other's efforts.
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